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Kenya's Agricultural Development Policy 
It is still useful to distinguish in Kenya agriculture between the former 
European and African areas, which used to be known as the Scheduled 
and Non-Scheduled Areas in this country. In the former Scheduled Areas, 
the key developments, to which the government found itself heavily 
committed at the time it took over in 1963, involve the transfer of owner-
ship of large parts of the mixed farming areas. Land settlement schemes 
in which large farms are subdivided into smallholdings, and the transfer 
of large farms intact to African owners, were started early in the 1960s 
as an answer to strong political demands for African ownership in the 
former European areas, and as an outlet for the growing numbers of 
landless and unemployed. The programme was undoubtedly successful 
in solving immediate political problems, but since the implementation of 
the settlement and land transfer schemes there has been a considerable 
amount of disillusionment, and a growing awareness of their colossal 
demands on development funds. In 1965/66 72 per cent, of the government 
agricultural development budget was going to the former European areas, 
mostly on these land transfer schemes. One of the most striking changes 
in policy, recently, has been the decision to shift the emphasis away from 
the former European areas -and the settlement schemes to the former 
African areas in which it is hoped to spend 69 per cent, of agricultural 
development funds by 1969-70, according to the Plan.1 
In the former African areas development is to rest on an accelerated 
programme of land reform, begun in the 1950s to introduce a system of 
individual titles to land throughout the small-scale farming areas; a new 
and ambitious programme of smallholder credit, hitherto rather unsuccess-
ful in Kenya; continually expanding educational and research activities; 
and a special programme for the pastoral areas. Specific crop and livestock 
programmes form part of this general framework, with production targets 
in many cases right down to the district level. 
There is to be a continuation of irrigation investigations and a rationaliza-
tion of existing irrigation schemes; there is to be some extension of settlement 
in the former African areas where there is good land to spare; there is 
a scheme for tsetse control in western Kenya; and there is an allocation 
for soil conservation work. But except for irrigation, none of these calls 
for a major allocation of development funds. Table 1 shows the distribution 
of central government development expenditure in agriculture during the 
six year period of the Plan. 
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T H E FORMER SCHEDULED AREAS 
The former European areas, which contributed 80 per cent, of the country's 
marketed agricultural output and an even higher proportion of agricultural 
exports, in 1960 covered 1\ million acres of land. Of this, 3.4 million 
acres was mixed farming land, which is considered suitable for the land 
transfer and settlement schemes, 2.6 million acres was in ranching, and 
1.5 million acres plantation land. In the mixed farming areas 1.0 million 
acres has now been settled with 30,000 small-scale farmers since 1962, 
and a further 100,000 acres is to be settled during the period of the Plan. 
Some of this has been in 'high density' schemes for the landless and 
unemployed with virtually no initial capital, and some in 'low density' 
schemes for the more prosperous small-scale farmers with some initial 
capital to contribute for a somewhat larger farm than they had in their 
tribal areas before. Six hundred thousand acres of mixed farming land 
has also been transferred intact to large-scale African farmers, with a 
further 250,000 acres to be transferred during the period of the Plan. 
This will leave just over 1 million acres of mixed farming land in the hands of 
relatively experienced farmers, and 150,000 acres to be operated by 
government as national or transitional farms. The old ranching and planta-
tion sectors get little attention in the Plan, but the large-scale ranching 
area is to be extended as part of the range development programme which 
will include new government and joint government/private ranches in 
uninhabited areas where the potential for ranching is high. 
The small-scale settlement farm programme has aroused widespread 
interest and a certain amount of controversy as well.2 The major part of 
the programme has already been carried out with tremendous speed: over 
1 million acres being subdivided and settled in less than 4 years.3 The 
programme has undoubtedly been important in facilitating the departure 
of the European mixed farmers who wanted to leave, without causing a 
major decrease in production, and it has also been important in demon-
strating that the government was being active in transferring European 
land to Africans, and providing for the landless and the unemployed. But 
from an administrative and economic point of view, the programme was 
too hurriedly planned and executed to be an undisputed success. 
The settlement programme is usually assessed in terms of the performance 
of individual smallholders in meeting loan repayments and in reaching 
target income levels, and the success -of- the programme as a whole in 
intensifying the use of the land, increasing output and employment per 
acre. But successes in these fields mean little unless judged in relation to 
costs. It is not difficult to achieve an increase in the intensity of land use, 
given a high enough level of supervision and capital. The important question 
is whether the returns to capital and skilled manpower are higher in 
settlement than elsewhere. This may seem an obvious point, but it is so 
often missed in discussions of the settlement programme in Kenya, that 
it seems worth stressing again here.4 
The government has now decided to reduce the settlement programme 
because it is felt that settlement does not represent the best use of develop-
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ment funds. But the comparison is made on somewhat arbitrary grounds, 
and there is no consideration of alternative types of settlement schemes. 
Settlement on the Kenya 'million-acre pattern' may be very expensive 
compared with development in other rural areas, but this does not 
necessarily rule out settlement of any kind. Uganda has some very low 
cost settlement schemes, for example,5 and if it is considered wise in 
Kenya to effect some sort of transfer in all the former European mixed 
farming areas, it might well be worth thinking about alternative methods, 
more efficient in their use of capital and skilled manpower than the present 
settlement schemes. 
In Kenya, a major settlement programme has already been implemented 
now though, so it is important also to consider the future of the 
existing schemes. One of the major problems which the government has 
to face is the loan repayment problem. Appendix Table 8 in the Plan 
shoWs that 13 per cent, of the total had been overdue for more than 
1 year at the end of 1965, and 62 per cent, for at least 3 months. According 
to Ruthenberg,11 the position is worse than it appears because many 
repayments have been made from down payments which individual settlers 
had to make when their applications were approved, and others have been 
made from income earned outside the schemes. 
' The settlers certainly start with extremely heavy loan commitments7 and 
there is now some doubt about their ability to repay, even if they are 
willing to do so. Loan repayments generally start 6 months after the 
settlers are installed, and they are phased rather inappropriately as far 
as their uses are concerned.8 A Government Mission has been looking into 
settlement recently, and it is hoped that they will come out with useful 
recommendations particularly on the loan repayment problem. 
In many cases farm plans suitable for the plot sizes and ecological 
conditions have not yet been found, but it should be possible to remedy 
this. Ruthenberg maintains that most of the plots on high density schemes 
are too large for the hoe and too small for oxen, while on low density 
schemes they are too large for oxen and too small for tractors.9 But it 
should be possible to mix cropping with livestock where these problems 
arise. While it may still be necessary to do more farm planning work for 
some of the schemes, this should not present an unsurmountable problem 
as long as it is recognized. There may also be a need to look into the 
organization of marketing where this is not functioning well. 
The schemes all begin with very intensive supervision and a much higher 
proportion of extension workers to farmers than in the former African 
small-scale farming areas.10 This makes it all the more important that they 
should show good returns. It was originally intended that the period of 
intensive supervision should be for 2-\ years, after which the schemes would 
revert to normal levels comparable with other small-scale farming areas, 
and that they would then function under co-operative management. It 
has been found impossible to withdraw at the end of the 2\ year period, 
given the necessity to leave a viable organization specially for collecting 
loans, and the period has now been extended to 5 years. Careful thought 
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will have to be given to the process of disengagement if it is to prove 
possible to withdraw after another 2\ years. The performance of co-
operatives, both on settlement schemes and elsewhere in the small-scale 
farming areas, suggests that it may not be possible even then to leave 
the centralized functions in their hands. 
Thus while the government can decide to reduce the scale of the future 
settlement programme, and while it may be well advised to look at 
alternative means of settlement even in connection with the programme 
of the next few years, it is left with problems on the existing settlement 
schemes, and the necessity to continue to devote substantial resources to 
these, if they are to be productive small-scale farming areas that will at 
least be successful enough to repay their loans. The mission on settlement 
may come up with useful recommendations, and it is hoped that anyway 
it will stimulate some fresh thinking in relation to the present schemes. 
The transfer of large-scale farms intact to African owners raises some-
what different issues, and more problems acknowledged in the Plan: 
'. . . most African-owned large-scale farms have deteriorated since 
their change of ownership, many presenting a typical run-down picture 
with dilapidated buildings, dips and fences; high mortality among 
livestock; heavy drops in crop yields; deterioration of farm machinery; 
and misuse of land and pasture leading in some cases to bush encroach-
ment. On many farms production per acre is estimated at only around 
20 per cent, of pretransfer levels.' (Development Plan, p. 155.) 
While many of these farms have not been subdivided, they have often 
gone to large groups of owners, many of them ordinary peasant, farmers 
who have joined together and found the money to pay for a European 
farm and all that it symbolizes. These people have no experience in 
managing a large-scale enterprise. Other farms have gone to better-educated 
people, but also with little farm management knowledge. The government 
answer to this situation is to continue with the programme on a reduced 
scale, 250,000 acres over the next 6 years compared with 600,000 in the past 
3 to 4 years, and to expand the training and supervisory facilities. There 
is to be a special service of extension officials for these farms, at present 
numbering 30 but to be expanded in the next year or so. There is already 
a training school with 80 places a year, and a second is to be built during 
the period of the Plan. The total cost of these educational and supervisory 
services will be £422,000, much of it recurrent of course. 
But, given the government's strategy of involving as many people as 
possible in the development process,11 is there any justification for spending 
so much on a programme such as this? There are 750 of these large-
scale farms at present and the programme during the Plan period might 
bring the numbers up to about 1,000. Some of the people involved may 
benefit very little from the educational programme proposed, and it may 
be a waste to try to rehabilitate their farms by spending a lot of money 
on them. What is to stop the government from using the machinery 
already available, through management orders, on at least some of these 
grossly run-down farms? 
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In addition to these two major land transfer programmes, there is 
£5 million for the maintenance of transitional farms which would otherwise 
be neglected, and the purchase of national farms for the provision of inputs 
that are strategic in the agricultural sector. The transitional and compassion-
ate case farms account for a major part of this expenditure, much of 
which is probably unavoidable. The national farm programme is more 
interesting: it is an imaginative answer to deficiencies in strategic inputs, 
some of which were becoming serious recently. The shortage of dairy cows, 
for example, in great demand in the former African areas, on the settlement 
schemes, and in the large farm sector itself, was becoming acute. The 
government acted quickly in acquiring two pedigree herds that were 
in danger of breaking up in 1965, but further action may still be necessary 
here. National farms are to be set up where the private sector cannot be 
relied on to provide inputs that are crucial to the agricultural sector, thus 
overcoming another problem created by the changed conditions in the 
large-scale farming sector since independence. 
LAND R E F O R M IN THE FORMER AFRICAN AREAS 
Land reform is generally recognized as a powerful development aid, as 
traditional land tenure systems are often such as to hamper the progress 
of modern small-scale farms.12 In Kenya, an ambitious programme of land 
tenure reform, involving the consolidation of fragments into single holdings 
and the registration of individual titles to land, has been under way since 
1956. Kenya is the first country in Africa to undertake a major land 
tenure reform of this kind, and it may well serve as an example to countries 
where similar traditional land tenure problems arise. It is extremely 
important, therefore, that the programme be properly evaluated. 
By the end of 1965, 1.6 million of the roughly 25 million acres considered 
suitable, had been registered, and over 3 million acres had been consolidated 
in preparation for registration.13 The Kikuyu, Embu and Meru districts 
north of Nairobi in Central Province were among the first to be consolidated 
and registered, with Nandi, Baringo, and Elgeyo-Marakwet further away 
to the north-west as well. Most of these areas were extremely crowded and 
seriously fragmented, and consolidation was necessary before the registra-
tion process. More recently the programme has been extended to various 
parts of Nyanza and Western Provinces and to Kajiado, one of the 
Masai districts, as well. 
The Plan provides for an accelerated programme of land consolidation 
and registration, with the eventual aim of covering nearly all of the 
12 million acres of farming land in the former African areas and 13 million 
acres of ranching land as well. In the first half of 1965/66, registration 
was running at 360,000 acres per year, at a cost of £605,000. The Plan 
allows for at least this much expenditure per year in future, and presumably 
higher acreages as the cost per acre is to be reduced. 
While there is little doubt that some of this programme is useful and 
necessary, it is not so clear that it is important everywhere, or that it 
is necessary to proceed at such a speed. The expenditure of more than 
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£4 million in one plan period, 17 per cent, of the central government 
develbpment budget for agriculture,14 on a process of land reform which 
cannot itself be directly productive, may have serious repercussions on 
the rest of the economy. This, together with the land transfer expenditure 
in the former European areas, makes the proportion of development funds 
to be spent on transfer processes exceedingly high, with correspondingly 
less funds and personnel available for direct development activities. The 
cost in terms of skilled manpower is likely to be even more serious than the 
money cost. 
The arguments for consolidation are somewhat different from those for 
registration, though the two seem to be treated together in the text of the 
Plan. Consolidation has been important in the Kenya programme hitherto, 
but it will be less important in future. Consolidation has several distinct 
benefits: labour is saved, it no longer being necessary to walk, carry 
manure, or move oxen and implements between plots; plots that are 
isolated and too small to be worth cultivating on their own are brought 
together in larger plots in which they can be used; and land wastage in 
tracks and paths is reduced (although more land is usually allocated for 
access roads, schools, markets and other public purposes). Consolidation 
also makes farm planning much easier, and it makes possible economies 
of scale in cultivating operations. It can make for an improved topographical 
layout of farms as well. 
But there are disadvantages in consolidation. The diversity made possible 
by fragmentation can be advantageous, either in spreading risks such as 
those of hail damage, or through ecological differences which make it 
possible to run complementary farm systems spreading labour peaks 
through the year. Highland cropping systems often fit in well with lowland 
ones, which make demands on resources at different times of the year. 
In parts of Kenya such problems are arising in the consolidation 
programme, and there is talk of registering several fragments per holding 
where there are distinct advantages in doing so. 
The arguments for registration are not so strong, and it is registration 
rather than consolidation which is to be important in the future programme 
now. Registration can lead to a reduction in litigation, increased incentives 
to invest, and the use of land as a security for credit. Litigation is certainly 
costly in areas where registration has not taken place, but it is quite 
possible that it will emerge again in the new system as well. It is by no 
means clear that registration has settled the question of land rights and 
inheritance to the satisfaction of the people concerned. There are holdings 
registered in the name of one person but effectively owned by many; there 
are others registered in the names of different people, effectively owned by 
one. The whole new system of inheritance has yet to be tested among the 
people concerned.15 
Investment incentives may be needed where there is real insecurity, 
but the enormous amount of investment that has already taken place in 
areas where there has been no registration makes one wonder if this is 
an important argument here. It is argued that it is easier to get credit 
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repayments if land titles are offered as security too, but the loan repayment 
position shown in the Plan (Appendix table 3) gives no support to this. 
Central Province, the only area listed where land has been registered for 
any length of time, has one of the worst records of repayment at present. 
It is argued that registration is important as a prerequisite for loans from 
the World Bank, too,10 and that this in itself is a good reason to go ahead. 
But it might be possible to persuade even World Bank officials that there 
are more effective ways of enforcing loan repayments than the registration 
of titles to land. A pilot scheme could be set up to demonstrate this. 
Arguments for registration seem to rest on the amount of insecurity 
that is felt over land ownership at present, and it might be advisable to 
give- priority to • areas where insecurity is evidently having an adverse 
influence on development now. 
The consolidation and registration exercise has an important impact 
on the unemployment situation. It is argued that it will have a beneficial 
effect on employment, through increases in productivity that occur. But 
the immediate effect of consolidation is to throw up the. landless and 
unemployed, making unemployment much more open than before. Unless 
it really can be shown that there are substantial positive advantages, there 
could be a case for holding back and keeping unemployment disguised 
where this is possible. 
In general, the arguments for consolidation appear more forceful than 
those for registration alone. But the arguments for slowing down are strong. 
The strain on resources imposed by such an intensive programme will be 
substantial, and this strain could be considerably eased if the programme 
were slowed down. There are no apparent reasons for speed, particularly 
where consolidation is not involved and the growing numbers of permanent 
improvements do not therefore present difficulties. 
Government policy on consolidation and registration is subject to 
revision when the report of the Lawrence Commission on land tenure 
reform is considered. It will be interesting to see what their conclusions are. 
T H E SMALLHOLDER CREDIT SCHEME 
The land tenure reform programme is accompanied by more positive 
development measures to make it effective. Once land tenure has been 
altered so that it is no longer a brake on development in the small-scale 
farming areas (and it is argued above that this may not be necessary in 
many parts of Kenya at present), it is important to apply more positive 
development measures. It is becoming increasingly recognized that the 
development of small-scale farming sectors is a problem of techniques 
and education as much as anything else. This is the argument of Schultz,17 
Mellor,18 and others whose views are widely accepted today. It is argued 
that the major limits to progress in small-scale farming areas in developing 
countries are in education and research, and that the low ratios of capital 
to labour and land are the result rather than the cause of their low stage 
of development. It is precisely because management and technical factors 
are lacking that capital investments are not profitable in agriculture at 
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present and the level of capital in small-scale farming remains low. Few 
people would go as far as to suggest that capital does not need to 
accompany extension and research, but many maintain that capital is not 
limiting in any direct way at present, and where capital is needed is in the 
development of extension and research. 
This being so, it is surprising to find the World Bank Missions, in their 
reports on Kenya and Uganda,19 putting such a major emphasis on 
smallholder credit. The Kenya Government appears to have accepted this 
view and smallholder credit features as one of its most important develop-
ment schemes now. In the Kenya Plan, £4.4 million is allocated to a 
smallholder credit scheme for 30,000 farmers in the areas of high potential 
ecologically. An additional £1 million or so is to be lent to smallholders 
who fall outside the main programme 'for administrative rather than 
economic reasons'. Thus the whole smallholder credit policy involves well 
over £5 million during the period of the Plan, over 20 per cent, of the 
central government budget for agriculture. 
The experience of smallholder credit schemes in Kenya, which have 
been in existence since 1948, and through which nearly £800,000 of 
government credit has now been lent, does nothing but confirm the general 
view. Appendix table 3 in the Plan shows the present position. In 7 
districts, representing half the total sum and more than half the number 
of loans given to smallholders since 1948, 16.7 per cent, have been overdue 
for more than 1 year, and 47.7 per cent, of the total sum due has not yet 
been repaid. While government officials have been bemoaning the fact 
that it is almost impossible to enforce repayment from Kenya smallholders, 
there has still not been any detailed study of the reasons for failure, 
particularly necessary when a large new programme is contemplated. 
There are indications that loans were often not needed on the farms, 
that they were directed towards the wrong kind of expenditure, and that 
there was a general misunderstanding on the part of the farmers as to 
what the loans involved. While the new programme is to be accompanied 
by a much increased supervisory staff, it is still by no means clear that 
our knowledge of the economics of the small-scale farms is sufficient to 
enable us to give the right kind of advice on loans, nor that even with 
the 30 per cent, increase in staff there will be enough technical and 
managerial experience to make a large-scale credit scheme work.20 
It is worth posing the question as to how short of capital funds the 
rural areas are, anyway. While we talk of the shortage of capital on the 
farms, we also talk of the possibility of mobilizing quite considerable 
savings from the small-scale farming areas in the period of the Plan.21 
While we worry about finance for small farm developments we watch 
the accumulation of capital from coffee and other cash crops, the proceeds 
of which have led to an enormous increase in small-scale business, trade 
and transport activities in many rural areas. The funds that were forth-
coming for low density settlement schemes, and for the purchase of large-
scale farms in the former European areas were also astonishing. Ruthenberg 
quotes a figure of £700,000 in down-payments for low density settlement 
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schemes alone. And the continued existence of large numbers of native 
cattle can itself be taken as an indication of stocks of capital at present 
yielding relatively low returns. There are certainly indications that small 
farmers are prepared to sell their cattle when profitable investment 
opportunities arise. One of the most important questions for the economy 
may well be now to tap more rural capital funds. 
Why is some of this capital not going into small farm development? 
And why can we not tap it for farm development now? There are many 
questions to which we do not yet have answers, but there are at least 
grounds for suspecting that a large-scale credit programme in the small-
scale farming areas will not bring the dividends expected in Kenya at 
present, and it seems surprising that the government should be prepared 
to launch a programme involving the expenditure of £5 million, in a 
scheme for which there has been no pilot study, and in which much of the 
evidence available is negative. While it may be too late for a complete 
change in policy, there is a strong case for initiating a study of the credit 
situation so that the major programme can be designed with some prob-
ability of success. 
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION 
Research and extension services, which are not easily separable in the 
development estimates as some of these expenditures are included in 
particular programmes, are to get moderately increased funds according 
to the Plan, but the government does not appear to feel that there is a 
case for a greatly expanded programme here. The section on research 
in the Plan is too short to be very explicit, but there are indications that 
with the change in emphasis from large-scale to small-scale farming, 
research priorities will also change. Kenya still lags behind Uganda 
in research on small tools, implements, ox-drawn and mechanical aids 
suitable for smaller farms, and there has been relatively little research 
into husbandry practices and crop mixtures for small farms. The past 
concentration on plant breeding has produced many valuable results, but 
there is room for a considerable diversification in research activities, as 
the government now appears to recognize. 
The extension programme is also to be enlarged and there is evidence 
of changes in outlook here as well. But there may be a case for a much 
more massive attack in this field, given increasing evidence on the 
importance of management factors on small-scale farms. There is a need 
to train farmers and lower level extension workers, but the need for 
additional training for the medium and high grades may be even more 
important. The Plan states that planned and existing educational facilities 
will provide only half of the university level, diploma level, and technical 
assistant level personnel. Of the other half many will have to be non-
Kenyans, and in some professions the shortages will undoubtedly be 
serious. This may well prove to be the major stumbling block in the 
agricultural Plan. 
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CROP AND LIVESTOCK PROGRAMMES 
The detailed crop and livestock programmes cannot be examined here 
except in general terms. There are some questionable priorities, as for 
example in the enormously expanded sugar production programme at a 
time when Uganda is searching for markets for her sugar, and the moderate 
targets for beef for which the prospects are extremely good. But the most 
interesting general feature of the detailed crop and livestock programmes is 
the attempt to make projections for many crops down to the district 
level. While it may be useful to begin to build up district production 
figures, there is a danger in using these rigidly at a stage when our 
knowledge and understanding of the economics of small-farm production 
in different districts is not sufficient to support the detailed plans. While 
it makes sense to encourage crops that look good, the field judgement 
as to which are most economic in different farm production situations is 
still in most cases best left with the farmer until we know more about 
the different farming patterns. We still cannot really afford to dispense 
with price and market indicators as the major tools for getting an efficient 
distribution of small-farm production in Kenya. And it may be dangerous 
to build up detailed district plans except as general guides within which 
flexibility is allowed. To quote an example from Tanzania: farmers in 
the west happily show visitors their acre of cotton 'for themselves' and 
their acre of sisal 'for the President'. They know that sisal is uneconomic, 
but as 'the President wants it' they grow it for him. 
Where it is still necessary to rely largely on market indications and 
incentives for farmers, it is important to ensure that the market functions 
well in this respect. It is important that market prices do reflect scarcities 
in the economy as a whole, and that marketing inefficiencies or manipula-
tions do not lead to inefficient farm production decisions. The role of 
the market in determining production patterns sometimes tends to get 
neglected in Kenya marketing discussions. 
T H E BALANCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
The emphasis in the Plan is on areas of high potential for agriculture or 
for ranching; the areas which are poor and heavily populated get little 
attention throughout. The areas where natural conditions are marginal 
for agriculture, but population is sparse can be used for ranching, and the 
Plan provides an ambitious range development scheme which should 
enormously improve their position. But in similar areas where population 
is dense it is not possible to develop livestock economies. It is in the 
densely populated marginal areas that the major famines in Kenya occur, 
and it is surprising that the Plan, written so soon after a famine year, should 
not consider the possibilities for developing these. In 1962, the country 
spent*"more than £5 million on famine relief, and in 1965 the cost was 
heavy again. Would it not be wise to try to lessen these unexpected 
emergency costs, by spending money on development in between? 
The neglect of famine areas may be due to a pessimistic attitude 
towards their development, and a feeling that nothing much can be done. 
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But there is no reason why this should be so. With the development of 
new varieties of drought-resistant maize it begins to look as though the 
famine areas may be able to feed themselves, even in drought years, 
and there is always the alternative of developing cash crops such as 
cotton which survive the drought relatively well, and using these to provide 
an income with which to buy food. The big problem there is in the present 
maize price structure, though. As long as a district that is short of maize 
has to buy maize at the high consumer price, it will be extremely difficult 
to provide a cash crop that is lucrative enough in the drought years to 
provide for food needs; and as long as the price of maize in drought years 
is so high, it will be difficult to persuade peopje not to grow maize.22 There 
are no good reasons to be pessimistic about the famine areas at present, 
and it is a pity that there is so little for them in the new Development 
Plan. The country can ill afford the massive emergency famine expenditures, 
and there are real possibilities of reducing these. 
The Plan also tends to favour the progressive rather than the mediocre 
farmers, and this again may not be wise. The smallholder credit programme, 
for which this is explicitly stated, is the major example, but there 
"are indications of this attitude throughout. Much of the rest of the 
development programme is geared towards the smallholder credit people, 
and there is a danger that in concentrating so heavily on the few, progress 
will be slower than it could be otherwise. Why is it assumed, for example, 
that extension services are wasted on all but the best? Why is it considered 
that returns to improved inputs are always greatest on the better farms? 
Might it not be true that there is more to be gained on the farms that 
have lagged behind? It has not been clearly established that the highest 
returns to development activities are on the best farms, and it may be 
unwise to place too much emphasis on this relatively small group. 
Finally, there is a question about criteria. There is little in the Plan 
to indicate that the right comparisons have been made. What made 
the planners decide to spend more on tea and less on beef? How can they 
justify the smallholder credit programme, not in isolation, but compared 
with the programme for the expansion of the extension services, for 
example? There are no discussions of alternatives: projects are justified, 
not as the best use of resources, but as good on their own. Any project 
can look attractive when there is no alternative. The question is not 
whether it is good but whether it is the best. 
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TABLE 1 
CENTRAL G O V E R N M E N T DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE ON AGRICUL-
T U R E A N D LIVESTOCK, INCLUDING L A N D REGISTRATION A N D 
SETTLEMENT 
1965/66 — 1969/70 
Former African Areas £ million 
Land consolidation and registration 4.36 
Smallholder credit 4.30 
Development of pastoral areas 2.42 
Irrigation 1.80 
Tsetse control .40 
Settlement 35 
Rural development schemes .12 
Former Scheduled Areas 
Million acre settlement programme 7.00 
1966/70 settlement programme 1.65 
Land transfer to large-scale farmers ... 3.10 
National and transitional farms of other kinds 5.14 
Functional Activities 
Credit not included elsewhere 1.00 
Research not included elsewhere .17 
Education and training .60 
Agricultural Development Corporation .65 
Soil conservation .24 
Crop Activities (not included elsewhere) 
Tea 1.60 
Sugar 1.40 
Wheat 15 
Pineapple .08 
Passion fruit .04 
Livestock Activities (not included elsewhere) 
Beef 1.09 
Dairying .34 
Sheep and goats .13 
Pigs 09 
Other 19 
TOTAL 38.43 
1 Includes national and transitional farms, compassionate case farms, and abandoned 
and mismanaged farms in the plan table. 
Source: Development Plan, p. 127-8. 
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